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INTRODUCTION
The importance of family businesses in the economy is unquestionable. Several classical researchers have advocated that corporate governance strategy views family business as potential instrument to correct the action of risky managerial behavior at the expense of shareholders (Eddleston, Although these studies have shown collective findings in the literature, such as positive, negative and null relationship between the two concepts and the difference measure of firm performance, most have drawn the sample from US and other European countries. For instance, Martínez et al. (2007) , using a simple of 175 Chilean listed firms examine the relationship between family ownership and firm performance for family and non-family firms. Their results support the ideas that family-controlled firms performed significantly better than non-family firms.
In addition, Allouche et al (2008) obtain similar findings using Japanese firms, conclude that family companies perform better than nonfamily businesses. However, Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) did not find any association between family involvement in the ownership and performance for the Italian companies. Their study suggests that the presence of the family in the ownership and management of the firm can be an advantage (a corporate governance strategy for solving conflict of interest between managers and shareholders) or a disadvantage (family opportunism) for company competitiveness. Anderson and Reeb (2004) adds that an effective corporate governance mechanism is one that limits the controlling family or shareholders from engaging in undesired behaviour at the expense of the minority shareholder (family opportunism).
The presence of the conflicting argument in the family business literature and the mixed results led us to suspect that Spain provides an interesting case to examine the influence of family involvement in framing a corporate governance strategy for firm performance, which differs from those in US, Japan, Chile, Poland and Italy. The aim of this study is to address above theoretical question by providing an empirical analysis on how family ownership structure affects corporate performance over the period 2010 to 2014. Based on some specific characteristic of Spanish firms, we incorporate the influence of the degree of concentration of ownership and whether or not family company being listed on the stock market can affect its performance.
We collected data from the SABI database over the period 2010 to 2014. Our panel has information on ownership structure (concentrated. dispersed, unknown), generation (1ª, 2ª, and 3ª), as well as financial variables. The total number of sample family firms derived is 47.590 with 72,7% family firm have concentrated ownership, 22,8 have dispersed ownership and 4,5% with unknown ownership (see Table1) . Looking at corporate performance, ownership structure of a family firm has a positive impact on its performance. Specifically, family firms with concentrated ownership outperformed family firms with dispersed ownership. Family firm in the 1ª generation outperform family businesses in the 2ª and 3ª generation is supported. Also, aggressive incentive policy negatively affects the performance of family business for the 1ª generation and is false for the 2ª and 3ª generation. Unlisted family firms have lower performance than listed family firms. This result shows that medium size family businesses do better than small and large size family businesses. Our findings are consistent with Daily and Dollinger (1992) , Sraer According to the most conservative estimates, between 65% and 80% of companies worldwide are owned by one or more families, or directed by them (Miller et Thus, understanding the peculiarity surrounding the characteristic of family ownership lay the foundation for the changing economy phenomenon cause by family firms around the globe. Recent studies on the family ownership literature have compared the characteristics and performance of family firms to those of non-family firms due to the classical agency problem. Other studies contribute to the existing body of knowledge by illustrating that a large number of listed firms do not have a widely-dispersed ownership structure in most financial markets. And that these firms have in general individual or collective ownership that can be classify as families, other industrial or financial companies or the states. Related to this view, family firms tend to be more dominant ownership among the other type of ownership. According to Demsetz (1983) and Himmelberg et al (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) companies' choice on the level of ownership are based on minimizing agency cost rather than the influencing the firm value. Thus, this perspective on ownership structure provokes a critical analysis on the impact of family ownership structure on corporate performance.
Some empirical authors argue that families that have a strong tie to the firms, the firm is managed with a much longer time horizon, are more profitable and have a higher market value than nonfamily companies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that the family ownership might be a way to resolve the issue of agency problem arising between shareholder and their managers, because, the controlling shareholder who is the founder monitor work better (and manager's worker harder) as the fractional stake increase when they get to keep more of the fruits of their labor. The presence of the controlling shareholder minimizes the possibility of classical conflict of interest between the founder and the managers, and thus reduces agency costs. As oppose to non-family firm or widely held firm which are entitled to a manager with the interest to maximize his own private benefits. However, as ownership becomes more concentrated, controlling shareholder may engage in undesirable behavior at the expense of the minority shareholders. This attitude of controlling shareholder can lead to agency cost of type II.
In most cases, investors will prefer taking minority ownership in countries where shareholders' rights are protected, contrary to a country where the legal framework fail to provide sufficient shareholders' protection, investors will prefer to act as a controlling shareholder in the firms. With respect to the above mentioned, the setting of ownership structure remains uncertain as to whether a greater control right of the controlling shareholder to exhibit undesirable behavior at the expense of the minority shareholders or the manager's ability to maximize his own private utility at the expense of the shareholders is more preferable. Moreover, research evidence over the years using sale growth, productivity and profitability as common measures for performance in both family and non-family ownership have demonstrated very different results. Specifically, non-family ownership has higher performance than family business in term of sales growth and productivity, contrary in term of profitability (Binder and Hamlyn 1994 Empirically, prior studies conducted in Spain provides evidence of effects in performance of family firms. The Spanish family business is of great interest, since the largest family businesses in some of the major sectors of the economy are Spanish, as reflected in the Top 500 global family companies with higher income, according to the index developed . In Spain, approximately 90% of the Spanish companies are considered family business, which contributed approximately 60% of the GDP of the country and two-third of the total employment. These percentages differ depending on the size of companies, being remarkable the lower weight of family businesses in the segment of the largest. Also, the work force employed by these family companies represent 70% of the total private employment (Peres and Lluch 2015; Pison et al. 2014) .
The aim of this study is to address above theoretical question by providing an empirical analysis on how family ownership structure affects corporate performance over the period 2010 to 2014. Based on some specific characteristic of Spanish firms, we incorporate the influence of the degree of concentration of ownership and whether family company being listed on the stock market can affect its performance. We further consider the presence of generational succession and incentive policy relating to the performance of family business.
Family businesses with ownership concentrated outperform than family businesses with dispersed ownership. Family businesses in the 1ª generation outperform family businesses in the 2ª and 3ª generation. Aggressive incentive policy negatively affects the performance of family business.
The Spanish sample reveals some properties of continental European country; therefore, its formation is different from the Anglo Saxon with relating studies. We collected data from the SABI database over the period 2010 to 2014. Our panel has information on ownership structure (concentrated. dispersed, unknown), generation (1ª, 2ª, and 3ª), as well as financial variables. The total number of sample family firms derived is 47.590 with 72,7% family firm have concentrated ownership, 22,8 have dispersed ownership and 4,5% with unknown ownership (see Table1) . Looking at corporate performance, ownership structure of a family firm has a positive impact on its performance. Specifically, family firms with concentrated ownership outperformed family firms with dispersed ownership. Family firm in the 1ª generation outperform family businesses in the 2ª and 3ª generation is supported. Also, aggressive incentive policy negatively affects the performance of family business for the 1ª generation and is false for the 2ª and 3ª generation. Unlisted family firms have lower performance than listed family firms. This result shows that medium size family businesses do better than small and large size family businesses. Our findings are consistent with Daily and Dollinger (1992) , Sraer and Thesmar (2007) , Anderson and Reeb (2003) .
This article is structured as follows: in the first section, we review the literature of about family business performance, ownership structure in family business, in listed and no listed companies, and impact in performance of incentive policy, as the same time as some testable hypotheses are formulated. Third section provides information about the sample and discusses the methodology used in this article. In the fourth section the empirical results are presented. In the five section, we present conclusions of the research study.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES

Family Business vs Performance
Empirical research in the field of family business has attained a significant number of articles in which the performance of the family business with unfamiliar are compared. The performance is measured in recent research by various ratios differently from variables (such as sales and growth rate of sales, number of employees) or profit ratios (such as return on assets and return on equity) (Peres and Lluch 2015).
Research evidence over the years have demonstrated very different results. Binder and analysed the sale growth, productivity and profitability as common measures for performance in both family and non-family business. Specifically, their results show that nonfamily business have higher performance than family business in term of sales growth and productivity, however, in term of profitability, result shows no significant effect on performance for both family and non-family business. Similarly, Westhead and Cowling (1997) used the same variables and they found no statistical significant relationship with performance, meanwhile, very little statistical significant difference was found between performance and sale growth (Ntoung et al. 2016a) .
With respect to the size of the firms, using small size firms, Daily and Dollinger (1992) concluded that small family businesses have better performance to small non-family businesses, in term of sales growth and profitability. Meanwhile, Leach and Leahy (1991) applied similar study on large firms and found that family with greater degree of control in the firm has a positive effect on performance. Thus, the larger companies with greater proportion of ownership by the family have better financial ratios, particularly about sales growth, asset growth, profits as well as the rate of return to shareholders. Ganderrio (2002) contrasts the hypothesis of a better long-term performance of family businesses using financial ratios such as return on equity (ROE), thus, obtaining higher equity / debt ratio, and lower equity to assets ratio, meaning that these findings result from the fact that non-family business more easily access the market.
Further, introducing the variable age of the company in the analysis, Anderson et al. (2003) , in a cross-sectional analysis, and based on a variable of profitability, return on assets (ROA), and market measure (Tobin's Q2) to evaluate the performance, illustrate that family business in first generation in the hands of the founder is most efficient due to the fact higher profit and higher market value are common characteristics of such company unlike the case for non-family.
In 
Family Ownership vs Performance
Existing research on the impact of family business ownership structure on the performance is still inconclusive. Although some authors point to poor performance of family business in the 2º generation, others such as Sraer and Thesmar (2007) claimed that the performance of family business with heir CEO outperform those of founder CEO, while the performance of family business with heir CEO outperform those with professional CEO.
In Spain, ownership of family businesses can be characterised into three groups: concentrated ownership, dispersed ownership and publicly ownership. According to Rojo et al. (2011) and Ntoung et al (2016a) and a recent publication from the institution of family businesses, (2015), family business is considered of having concentrated ownership when a member of the family is a shareholder or a director with more than 50% of total ownership whereas, companies with a member of the family who is a shareholder or a director possessing an individual participation of 5% to 20% or a collective participation of 20% to 50% of the total ownership is considered a dispersed ownership. Finally, unknown owned family companies are considered as businesses where their shareholders are known but the percentages of their ownership are unknown. So, far literature on family businesses have laid a lot of emphasis on the performance of family businesses versus non-family businesses. Limited evidence has been illustrated on how the ownership structure of family businesses impact its performance. Thus, it the premise of this study to take into incorporate the ownership structure of family businesses and to check if there exist a significant effect on the performance. It claims that family businesses with concentrated ownership significantly outperform family businesses with dispersed ownership.
Hypothesis 1: Family businesses with ownership concentrated outperform than family businesses with dispersed ownership.
Generation vs Performance
Anderson and Reeb (2003) considered first generation family firms are those with life-span less than 30 years while 2ª generation family firms are those with life-span between 30 to 60 years. Family businesses above 60 years are considered as 3ª generation firms. Existing studies argue that when family firm progresses from one generation to the next, their performance decline, as they apply to the willingness or the ability of the next-generation family firm to increase profit and growth. Moreover, as family businesses move from one generation to the next, their goals change, which can result to a declined in performance. First generation family businesses are more business oriented that 2ª and 3ª generation, and as such have the capacity to improve their performance through high profit and growth (Reid et al. 1999; Dunn, 1995) . Consistent with this argument Mishra et al. (2001) claim that family ownership in younger firms has a higher positive impact on the performance compare to 2ª and 3ª generation family firms, as the family ties have been weakening and lower cohesiveness among family member as they approach the 2ª and 3ª generation. Other studies attribute that the reason why most family businesses when they move to the 2ª and 3ª generation have lower performance is due to the lack of competences and skills of the descendants. Hiring a better and more experienced external manager is mostly disregarded, these companies face a lack of managerial resources, which limits their ability to attain high performance.
Hypothesis 2: Family businesses in the 1ª generation outperform family businesses in the 2ª and 3ª generation.
Incentive Policy vs Performance for Family Business
Existing studies of the impact of incentive policy on the performance of family firms are based mainly on cross-sectional data, examining performance of family firm differences using either dividend divided by total assets or profit as dividend policy. However, prior literature with respect to the incentive policy on performance of family business is still inconclusive. Although some authors find a negative effect of incentive policy on performance, other authors find a positive relation between incentive policy and performance of family businesses. These results have been explained by either an increase motivation to worker for more production (incentive motivate worker to produce more for a given task leading to a positive effect) or an increase in personal expenses (incentive pays to workers increase the personal expenses in the profit or loss account which might not necessary lead to an increase performance leading to negative effect).
Several authors claim that majority of family firms pay incentive to their family members that work in the company. However, the agency theory affirm that members of family businesses should not collect incentive, because as owner of the firm, their remuneration is being derived through the growth of the firm's value. Referring to Fraser (1990) and Greco (1997) , approximately 80% of member of family businesses receive cash bonuses. Anderson (1985) finds that the payment of incentive has a direct effect on the performance of family business. From this agency perspective, it is important to define the incentive criteria according to the management of the company, its financial objectives as well as its survival in the future, as both the member of the family and the family business have diverse interest. In a similar way, Jensen and Meckling (1978) (2003) contrast the hypothesis on the relationship between firm's performance and the payment of incentives to family members. The author concludes that the reason behind the payment of incentive to family member is to actively involve them in the business and such firm obtain better result than others.
In addition, the absence of incentive schemes for workers that are not member of the family as well as those that are member of the family, adversely influence the performance of the firm, especially for small and medium size family businesses as opposed larger listed Family Corporation which are subject to external control procedures. Incentive policy become very essential for most family businesses seeking growth to move from the 1ª generation to the 2ª generation. Thus, higher incentive policy can be measure for family business in the 1ª generation than those in the 2ª generation.
Recent studies on unlisted family firms with concentrated ownership (50% owned by one shareholder), pay more interest relating dividend policy with the profile of corporate governance as well as the control of financial information ( Overall, it should be clear from the prior research overview that most authors find evidence of a change in performance of family businesses when incentives schemes are provided to workers be them member of family or not. Although both negative and positive effects have been identified, the conclusion that incentives scheme provided to workers of family firms leads to improve business performance prevails. Moreover, referring to previous studies which find evidence that provision of incentive schemes whether through extrapayments as workers of the firm, or from the dividend policy, as shareholders, it is expected that this positive impact of incentive policy on performance will be especially visible in the 1ª and 2ª generations than the 3ª, as well as for listed companies than the unlisted. In the 3ª generation, since most businesses are already doing better, the propensity for adoption of incentive policy diminishes. For this reason, we hypothesize Hypothesis 3: Aggressive incentive policy negatively affects the performance of family business.
Unlisted vs Listed Family Businesses
Beside the importance of the ownership structure of family business on its performance, we also analyse the level of transparency of its operation in the market. This corresponds to Anderson and Reeb (2003) Gallo et al. (2004) demonstrated that the difference in performance for unlisted family firms is not statistically significant, even though prior study present higher ROE for family listed firms (Gallo and Estapé 1992) .
The above literature overview clearly shows that one can expect to find a significant contribution of the level of transparency of family businesses' operation in the market, as well as the impact of generation on performance. Although the effect of whether a family business is listed or unlisted can be either positive or negative, the idea of the level of transparency seems prevailing, implying that unlisted family businesses have low performance than family businesses listed in the stock market. Based on these insights, we therefore hypothesize, Hypothesis 4: Unlisted family businesses outperform listed family businesses.
RESEARCH METHOD
Data
The sample was constructed based on the SABI of the Bureau Van Dijk, containing detailed financial information on more than 2.000.000 Spanish businesses. Our dataset is a panel of Spanish family businesses over the financial crisis 2010-2014 period. We employed several criteria to derive our sample population. We restrict ourselves to nonfinancial and non-real states family businesses since these industries are most influence by regulatory policy. For Figure 1) ; of which 50,660 were characterized with concentrated ownership; 13,089 for Dispersed Ownership. Further, we screened all family businesses and eliminated those companies with less than 2 years and family businesses with less than 10 employees were restrict to the study, as they often lack a high degree of formality in their organizational structure and management (Michaely and Roberts, 2012 ). Since our interest was gear toward the financial performance of Spanish family businesses with complete financial information during the crisis, we considered both limited and unlimited companies, as well as those listed and unlisted in the Spanish Stock Exchange. Thus, this resulted in a total population of 47.590 companies.
Family Business on the Spanish Market
In accordance with Amit and Villalonga (2006), we classify family firms as those firms when the founder or the member of the founder's family is a shareholder of the company. We divided our sample into three categories. Family firms with ownership concentrated, dispersed ownership and ownership where the shareholder are known but their participation is not revealed (IEF, 2015; Rojo et al. 2011). Family business is considered of having concentrated ownership when a member of the family is a shareholder or a director with more than 50% of total ownership whereas, companies with a member of the family who is a shareholder or a director possessing an individual participation of 5% to 20% or a collective participation of 20% to 50% of the total ownership is considered a dispersed ownership. Unknown ownership refers to family companies are considered as businesses where their shareholders are known but the percentages of their ownership is unknown. Table 1 reports the fractions of the ownership distribution of family firms from 2010 to 2015. These fractions are computed without weight (line 1), weighted with generation of family firms (line 2), and weight using the market status, as reported in the accounting information (line 3). As visible in Table 1 , approximately 72.7% of Spanish family businesses in our data have ownership concentration, as opposed to 22.8% of the Spanish family businesses have dispersed ownership.
With respect to the weighted using the generation, 57% of family firms with concentrated ownership predominantly belong to the 1ª generation, 15.5% and 0.3% belong to the 2ª and 3ª generations. However, for family firms with dispersed ownership, 16.8% and 5.8% belong to the 1ª and 2ª generation, whereas, 0.1% of family firms belong to the 3ª generation. Across the sample, 65.8% of the entire sample were consider to be unlisted with concentrated ownership while 21.5% are considered unlisted with dispersed ownership. Lastly, 6.9% of the firms are considered listed with concentrated ownership. Unlike 0.5% of the firms are considered listed with dispersed ownership. 3.3. Family firms with concentrated ownership differ from those with dispersed and unknown ownership Table 2 provides systematic differences between the ownership structure (concentrated, dispersed and unknown) of Spanish family businesses over 2010 to 2014. On average, when we look at the profitability of family business firms, those with concentrated ownership do better than those with dispersed and unknown ownership. For these family firms, profit stands around 23.2% for concentrated family firms, instead of 18.3% for the average family firm. Thus, concentrated ownership firms are the most profitable ones. This is because the controlling shareholder who is the founder monitor better (and manager's worker harder) as the fractional stake increase when they get to keep more of the fruits of their labor. Related occurrence arises for the ratio of dividend to assets or EBITDA.
With respect to sales growth, family firms with dispersed ownership grow, on average than family firms with concentrated ownership. For these firms, sales growth stand around 10.8% for dispersed firms, instead of 8% of the average family business in Spain from 2010 to 2014. One possible reason is that in most dispersed family business, the objective of most manager is to expand their interest using growth mechanism. Thus, they always booster the sale values. Incentive policy relatively higher for concentrated family firms than dispersed family firms. In contrast, high productivity arises for dispersed family firms with 34.1% than concentrated and unknown family firms with 17.3%. This is consistent with prior studies such as Rojo et al. Secondly, we analyze firm performance by looking at the growth in sales of the family business. The choice of using the growth in sales is due to the availability of information in SABI. To calculate the growth in sales, we considered the sales of period t minus sales value of period t-1 divided by the sales value for year t-1. Finally, productivity is measured by dividing the sales value of the year over the number of employees of that year. This is in line with work of Michaely and Roberts Independent Variable: In this study, low performance of unlisted family business with concentrated ownership as oppose to listed family business with owner concentrated is analyzed by relying on two questions which are available in SABI about the market status and ownership of family business. The first question addresses the fact that family businesses have difference characteristics when it comes to the market status. We assigned dummy variable equals one if a firm is listed or zero otherwise. We further allocated dummy equals to one if a firm is unlisted or zero otherwise. It enables to identify if not listing in the stock market causes a decline in the performance of family business. The second question addresses the ownership of family business. Through this question, we are able to identify how different in ownership might result to a decline in the performance of family business. A series of dummies were allocated equal to one if the ownership structure of the firms is categorized as concentrated, dispersed and unknown or zero otherwise. Putting these two questions together, we are able to identify the interaction between ownership structure (concentrated, dispersed or unknown) and the market status (listed or unlisted). This is consistent to the work of Allen et al. With respect to the second hypothesis, we analyzed family business performance by looking at generation as an independent variable. We consider the effect of generation on the corporate performance. It enables us to identify which generation that contributed most on the performance on the family business. According to Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Sraer and Thesnar (2007) , we identify all family businesses with age below 30 years as 1ª generation firms and allocate a dummy variable equals one if a firm is less than 30 years of age (Founders' firms), those firms with age between 31 to 60 as those in the 2ª generation (Heirs' firms) and all family firms with age above 61 years are 3ª generation family firm (Professional CEO). For each case, we assigned dummies equal to one if a firm is in the first generation, second generation and third generation or zero otherwise.
To test the third and fourth hypothesis that relate to the impact of incentive policy on corporate performance, dividend policies is adopted: dividend policy is measured by taking the dividend for the year scaled by total assets for the year. As illustrated above, family business with aggressive incentive policy will leads to a lower performance in the 1ª generation than in the 2ª and 3ª generations firms. This is because, as most family business approaches to the 2ª and 3ª generation the incentive to motivate workers be them members of the family or not, since the business have attained some level of performance, the propensity to adopt incentive policy decline. Unlike in the 1ª generation when the founder desire high profitability and growth as well as market value, create incentives schemes programs for employees (Gonzale et al It is calculated as the difference being the year of analysis and year of incorporation. However, Honjo and Harada (2006) , claim that including the company age in the regressions result to a collinearity problem that can occur between this variable and the year dummies in a within-firm analysis. Lastly, the year variable are included to control for the macroeconomic factors. The result in this study were checked for their robustness against outliers in the sample by removing the most extreme 1% cases of the dependent variables in our analyses (see Table 3 ). To validate the results of this study for their robustness against outliers in the sample, we removed the most extreme 1% cases of the dependent variables in our analysis. Table 4 illustrate the Pearson correlation of the variables used in this study.
Empirical Models
According to Pere-Gonzalez (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2007) , cross-sectional analysis has several limitation and shortcoming that might prevent us from estimating all the time-invariant characteristics. These time-invariant characteristics might have some importance effect on corporate performance, therefore, it important to employ the panel data methodology. We claim that a crosssectional analysis is less suitable to indicate causal effects of corporate performance because it gives only indirect evidence of the impact of ownership as well as the incentive policy of the family firms. In accordance with Molly et al (2010, p.139), following a fixed-effects approach, the within-firm variation in corporate performance because of generation and ownership are analyzed by controlling for timeinvariant characteristics that are often difficult to observe or measure. These characteristics vary across firms but are assumed to be constant for each ndividual firm and provide specific effects to the industry in which the firm operates. The fixedeffect panel data analysis does not allow using industry dummies in the regression models because industry is expected to be time-invariant and therefore is included in the firms' intercept. We estimate the following fixed-effects panel data analysis,
(1)
where y it is measure of corporate performance (based on profitability, and productive). 
RESEARCH RESULTS
Ownership
In this section, we provide explanation to the results obtained from the regression model (1) regarding the impact of ownership structure on corporate performance of family businesses in Spain. The effect of dispersed ownership, the concentrated ownership, as well as unknown ownership of family businesses are presented in Table 5 . The first regression in Table 5 describes the results regard to the productivity, the second regression shows analysis related to profitability, and the third regression illustrate the growth in sales.
Our result shows that after controlling for several firm characteristics, a statistical significant effect can be found for all the three types of ownership structure. On average, the model provide evidence that there exist a positive and statistical significant effect of ownership structure on firm performance for overall sample with 2,78 for productivity, 0,59 for profitability and 0,23 for sales growth, respectively. This shows that the ownership structure a family firm adopt has a positive impact on its performance. Also, a quick examination of Table 5 shows that family firms with concentrated ownership outperformed family firms with dispersed ownership (row b > c). The difference in productive (PD = 8, 86) for family firm with concentrated is higher than the difference in productive (PD = 7, 04) for dispersed family businesses. With respect to profitability, ROA = 0, 79 for concentrated family firms are higher than profitability (ROA = 0, 19) for dispersed family firms, as well as unknown family businesses. Growth in sales (SG = 0, 02) is higher for concentrated family firms than sales growth (SG = 0, 01) for dispersed family firms. Apparently, the effect of ownership structure of family is very important to its performance. Therefore, hypothesis 1 which states that family businesses with ownership concentrated outperform than family businesses with dispersed ownership is supported.
We also add other controls such as incentive policy (d and e), and efficient policy (f and g), log of firms' age, size, and market status, which can have a significant impact on corporate performance. The results show that for concentrated family business, incentive policy have a positive impact on corporate performance. All the measure of corporate performance (PD, ROA, SG) are positive and statistical significant at the 1% level, with 1, 89 for PD, 3, 78 for ROA and 0, 22 for sales growth, respectively. One reason for this performance can be attributed to the fact that the controlling shareholder who is the founder monitor better (and manager's worker harder) as the fractional stake increase when they get to keep more of the fruits of their labor. However, our result demonstrates that for most dispersed family businesses, sales growth is highest. This can be attribute to the growth in sales or incentive to invest in line of production that can booster sales values. Thus, incentive scheme policy can result to an increase in sales but negatively affect profit, especially when it is not directly link to the cost driver. Even though incentive scheme policy positive affect sales growth in our model but the other corporate measures were negatively and not significant. Our result is consistent with Anderson (1985) , Bryson et al. (2011) and Schulze (2003) , the payment of incentive scheme program to family members is to actively involve them in the business and as such leading to better performance. This result does not support the hypothesis 3 that aggressive incentive policy negatively affects the performance of family business.
Also, efficiency policy has a significant positive impact of corporate performance for dispersed family firms unlike a negative and nonsignificant impact on corporate performance for concentrated firms. On the other hand, on average the age variable negative affect the performance of family business be it concentrated or dispersed as well as unknown. Meanwhile, the size of a firm's assets positive and significantly influence its performance. Even though size have a positive impact on performance, we address the size variable comparing three groups of family firms, namely, large, medium and small (see Table 7 , for further details). Finally, the market status of a family indicates if a family business is listed or not. Not listed in the Spanish stock exchange negatively affect two corporate performances (-0, 10 for profitability and -2, 01 for productivity) whereas with respect to sales growth (0, 24), a family becomes indifference to its operation on the stock market. Unlisted family firms have lower performance than listed family firms. This result is consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
and Sales growth (SG). Ownership is a dummy indicating ownership structure. Dispersed ownership (d) is a dummy indicating that a companies with a member of the family who is a shareholder or a director possessing an individual participation of 5% to 20% or a collective participation of 20% to 50% of the total ownership. Ownership concentrated (c) is a dummy indicating that when a member of the family is a shareholder or a director with more than 50% of total ownership. Other independent variables include Incentive policy -dividend distributed t/TA, t; Efficiency policy -(Personal Exp. + other Exp.)/Sales, Age (logarithm of firm's age measured in years plus one), Size (logarithm of book value of total asset). Market status (dummy equal to1 if the firms is unlisted in the Madrid Stock Exchange), Year fixed effects (Year FE)
, for industry specific effect, we considered only non-financial industry. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
Generation
In other respects, generation of family firm contribute significantly to its performance. Most family business attained economics of scale as it grows bigger during its life-span. The first regression in Table 6 describes the results regard to the productivity, the second regression shows analysis related to profitability, and the third regression illustrate the growth in sales.
Testing the hypothesis 2 using model (2) which state that family businesses in the 1ª generation outperform family businesses in the 2ª and 3ª generation. The model 2 provides evidence that generation has a positive effect on family firm's performance at the 1% level of significant for overall sample with 5,42 for productivity, 5,05 for profitability and 2,00 for sales growth, respectively (row a). This shows that family businesses at difference generation levels have positive impact on its performance. Moreover, a quick examination of Table 6 shows that family firm in the 1ª generation does outperform family businesses in the 2ª and 3ª generation, (row b > c). The difference in productive (PD = 1, 92) for family firm in the 1ª generation is higher than the difference in productive (PD = 7, 04) for 2ª family businesses, as well as the 3ª generation. With respect to profitability, ROA = 2, 07 for in the first generation is higher than profitability (ROA = 2, 10) for 2ª family businesses, as well as the 3ª generation. Growth in sales (SG = 0, 19) is higher for family firm in the 1ª generation than sales growth (SG = 0,02) for 2ª family businesses, as well as the 3ª generation, respectively. Apparently, the generational levels have an important impact on corporate performance. Therefore, hypothesis 2 which states family businesses in the 1ª generation outperform family businesses in the 2ª and 3ª generation is supported. This result is consistent with the study of Reid et al. (1999) and Dunn (1995) .
Regarding the other independent variables, we find remarkable result for incentive schemes policy across the generational levels. Incentive policy has a negative effect on family firms' performance at the 1% level of significant for 1ª generation family firms with -0, 54 for productivity, -0, 46 for profitability, unlike a positive and significant impact on sales growth, with 0,38. In the 2ª and 3ª generation, the coefficient of model 2 are not significant. This indicates that most of the 2ª and 3ª generational family businesses pay less attention on incentive policy to booster their corporate performance. In the first generation, due to the need for expansion, earn more profit, to increase production, family firms are compelling to adopt aggressive policy lead to a negative impact of corporate performance. Thus, hypothesis 3 which states that aggressive incentive policy negatively affects the performance of family business, is true for 1ª generational firms and false for 2ª and 3ª generational firms. We find the logarithm of size positively significant, which is like the result obtained between ownership and corporate performance.
In sum, efficiency policy has a significant positive impact of corporate performance for 2ª and 3ª generation family firms unlike a negative and non-significant impact on corporate performance for 1ª generational firms. On the other hand, on average the age variable negative affect the performance of family business. Finally, the market status of a family indicates if a family business is listed or not. Not listed in the Spanish stock exchange negatively affect two corporate performances (-0, 00 for profitability and -0, 24 for productivity) whereas with respect to sales growth (0, 13), a family becomes indifference to its operation on the stock market. Unlisted family firms have lower performance than listed family firms. This result is consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Faccio et al. (2001) . It is not consistent with Menédez-Requejo (2005), Gallo and Estapé (1992) . This result does not support the hypothesis 4 that unlisted family businesses outperform listed family businesses. 
Family Business vs Corporate Performance
In this section, we provide explanation to the results obtained from the regression model (3) regarding the corporate performance of family businesses in Spain. We include the ownership structure and the generational levels in one model, as well as the proxies for corporate performance. The performance of family businesses is presented in Table 7 . The first regression describes the results regard to the productivity, the second regression shows analysis related to profitability, and the third regression illustrate the growth in sales.
Our result shows that after controlling for several firm characteristics, a statistical significant effect can be found for ownership structure and generational levels for all Spanish family firms over the period 2010-2014. On average, the model provide evidence that there exist a positive and statistical significant effect of ownership structure on performance at 1% level, with 2,6 for productivity, 0,57 for profitability and 2,5 for sales growth, respectively (row a). This shows that the ownership structure a family firm adopt has a positive impact on its performance. Like ownership structure, generational levels have positive effect on family firm's performance at the 1% level of significant for overall sample with 0,31 for productivity; 0,40 for profitability and 2,52 for sales growth, respectively (row b). Apparently, the effect of ownership structure and generation of family firm are two important variables that influence the performance.
We also add other controls such as incentive policy, efficient policy, log of firms' age, size, and market status, which can have a significant impact on corporate performance. Incentive policy have a positive impact on corporate performance with 0,29 for productivity, 3,79 for profitability and 0,22 for sales growth, respectively (row c). Like incentive policy, efficiency policy significantly influence corporate performance with 7,3 for production, 0,01 for profitability and 0,00 for sales growth, respectively, (row d). Our result is consistent with Anderson (1985) , Bryson et al. (2011) and Schulze (2003) . This result does not support the hypothesis 3 that aggressive incentive policy negatively affects the performance of family business.
Meanwhile, model 2 provides evidence that size has a positive effect on family firm's performance at the 5% level of significant for overall sample with 0,98 for productivity, 0,69 for profitability and 1,5 for sales growth, respectively (row e). Specifically, medium size family firms outperform small size firms (row f > row g). The difference in productive (PD = 1, 46) for medium size is higher than the difference in productive (PD = 0,1,03) for small size family firms, as well as the large family firms. With respect to profitability, (ROA = 0, 62) for medium size family firms is higher than profitability (ROA = 0,23) for small and large family firms. Growth in sales (SG = 0, 19) is higher for family firm in the medium size family firms than sales growth (SG = 0, 01) for small size family firms, as well as the large family firms. This result shows that medium size family businesses do better than small and large size family businesses.
Our 
Robustness Tests
The evidence provided by this study cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of ownership structure on corporate performance because of robustness, we claim that the family status and generational level depends itself on performance. Corresponding to Sraer and Thesmar (2007) , Pérez-González (2006) , simultaneity bias could occur in a cross-section if it were easier to transfer corporate control from one generation to another when family business does well be it professionally managed family firm with dispersed ownership or with concentrated ownership. To address this, we follow the same application in Sraer and Thesmar (2007) . Due to the limited time frame in our panel model, two years before transmission period was considered and 20 events were noticed. Next, we check if this event outperformed the industry prior to the transmission and found that owners concentrated (founder or descendant) are not considered as having the best firms. Also, we considered family firms that were transmitted to professional managers (dispersed ownership) and we got 15 events. The result was not statistical significant and underperformed the industrial benchmark. Thus. it is possible to conclude that only higher performance family firms have concentrated ownership, even though the number of transitions we base our analysis is very small to a sufficient statistical power.
Next robustness check refers to the endogenous sample selection, 2ª generation family firms with insolvency situation or to be sold, that cannot manage itself to the 3ª generation. Thus, only 2ª generational firms that survive can move to the 3ª generation, implying overestimation of performance. To check if this is the case, we considered profitability of all family firms from 2010-2013. We had a total observation of 23 of ª generation firms, 31 of 2ª generation firms and 29 of 3ª generation firms. We found that the probability ratio was like the remaining firms. We notice that out of 4% of industry adjusted ROA, the second-generation firms underperformed the 3 ª generation firms. This show that endogenous attrition if any will lead to underestimation of the 2ª generation, can't lead to over performance.
We check the possibility of multicollinearity influencing our results by looking at the correlation among the independent variable in Table 3 . Following the Molly et al, (2010) approach, the correlation among the independent variable are smaller except for size. We employed an alternative method by using the logarithm of the total employment as proposed in Molly et al., (2010), however, our result does not change either. Next, we excluded size variable from the models, with no variance inflation factors showing more than 10, our result remains unchanged and conclude that multicollinearity have very little effect on our result.
CONCLUSION
The fact that ownership structure of a family business can have an impact on its corporate performance should not be confuse given that as family business move from one generation to another show their level of success and a critical event of the life cycle of the family. In fact, many family firm fails to reach the 2ª or 3ª generation because they are unsuccessful in overcoming the difficulties surround their ownership structure. Thus, it relevance studying the insights relating ownership and performance of family business as they move from one generation to another. This might lead to best practices regarding how a family business is expected to change over long period of its life-span.
Even though, prior studies have investigated the performance and behaviour of family business, evidence usually lacks some theoretical framework, mainly because it is restricted to most large corporation or based on a restricted panel analysis, our study seek to overcome these shortcomings by providing analysis for large, small and medium size family businesses in Spain using a panel model. This allow us to provide evidence that the corporate performance of family businesses is influence by the ownership structure, more especially as a family business moves from one generation for another generation.
As illustrated by our results, ownership structure of a family firm has a positive impact on its performance. Specifically, family firms with concentrated ownership outperformed family firms with dispersed ownership, which supports Hypothesis 1. With respect to Hypothesis 2, the model 2 provides evidence that generation has a positive effect on family firm's performance at the 1% level of significant. However, family firm in the 1ª generation does outperform family businesses in the 2ª and 3ª generation is supported.
Incentive policy has a negative effect on family firms' performance at the 1% level of significant for 1ª generation family firms unlike in the 2ª and 3ª generation, the coefficient of model 2 are not significant. This indicates that most of the 2ª and 3ª generational family businesses pay less attention on incentive policy to booster their corporate performance. Thus, hypothesis 3 which states that aggressive incentive policy negatively affects the performance of family business, is true for 1ª generational firms and false for 2ª and 3ª generational firms. Finally, the possibility of a family firm not listed in the Madrid stock exchange negatively affect two corporate performances. Unlisted family firms have lower performance than listed family firms. This result does not support the hypothesis 4.
As shown, model 2 conclude that size has a positive effect on family firm's performance at the 5% level of significant Specifically, medium size family firms outperform small size firms (row f > row g). This result shows that medium size family businesses do better than small and large size family businesses. Our findings are consistent with Daily and Dollinger (1992) and not consistent with Leach and Leahy (1991) , where larger corporation due to their greater degree of control by the family outperformed have better financial ratios, particularly to sales growth, asset growth, profits as well as the rate of return to shareholders.
From a theoretical perspective, this study clearly to some extent provides further evidence that the type of ownership structure adopted by a firm can result to positive effect on it performance, more especially as the company move from one generation to another. This result is consistent with Rojo et al. (2011), (Sraer and Thesmar (2007) , Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Faccio et al. (2001) .
